Devotion to Land, Bible and Constitution

The writer below notes that historians burdened with modern egalitarian standards often “do not grasp the most elementary concept of the sound historian: the ability to appraise the past by standards other than those of the present. They accept a fanatical nationalism which leaves no room for sectional variations.”

Devotion to Land, Bible and Constitution

Jefferson Davis [is condemned by biographers] as a prolonged conspirator against the Union. But the facts show that as late as 1860 he, as a United States senator, was advocating appropriations for the army he was to fight in less than a year. A proper sympathy for the sectional values would perhaps lead to a condemnation of Davis because he did not become a conspirator against the Union soon enough.

Davis was not one of the great revolutionists of history; he was too honorable for that. Unlike William L. Yancy and R. Barnwell Rhett, he was slow in understanding that the North was in a revolutionary conspiracy against the Constitution as he interpreted it and could be answered effectively only by counterrevolution. Allen Tate, the poet, is the only biographer who condemns Davis for not understanding that the aim of the plutocratic democracy of the North was to crush his beloved homeland.

Davis should be praised for finally recognizing the forces arrayed against his section and then heroically defending its concept of truth and justice. Despite physical weaknesses, he maintained a proud but ragged nation for four years against the powers of wealth, progress and patriotism. After defeat he did not repent.

For his failure to repent, historians will not forgive Davis. He did not respond to the new wave of nationalism which came after the Civil War. He was no pragmatist, no evolutionist. Until his death, he remained devoted to his section, the soldier who found greatest virtue in continuing the battle charge after the enemy has inflicted a grievous wound and remained the scholastic who accepted the Bible and the Constitution just as they are written. He was as optimistic in his devotion to the antique values of the South as was Don Quixote to the antique values of an older land.

If the historians of the South were as tolerant of our past as are the European historians of theirs, they would confer on the defeated President of the Confederacy as many honors as have been conferred on the famous Spanish knight.”

Tolerating the South’s Past. Francis Butler Simkins. Journal of Southern History, Vol. XXI, No. 1, February 1955, pp 33-8)

The Radical Star Chamber

The Radical element of the Republican party emerged as a means to direct and control Lincoln’s war against the American South. West Point-graduate General George McClellan was an early casualty of Radical meddling as they strove to ensure that Radicalized military commanders- usually inept – were selected for high command.

The Radical Star Chamber

“It is a sordid story of how the people’s representatives, Sumner, Stevens, Wade, Chandler, Trumbull, Henry Wilson, Henry Winter Davis, and others, undertook to determine the conduct of the war for partisan purposes. They are shown as the representatives of the new “bourgeoisie” who ‘intended to do more than use their new-fledged political power to consolidate an already dominant economic position. They meant to extend the new industrial order to the South and make that section an economic adjunct of the North.’

The most certain way to accomplish this double purpose would be to destroy slavery, and with it the Old South. The Radicals ‘loved the Negro less for himself than as an instrument with which they might fasten Republican political and economic control upon the South.’ Lincoln saw the war as a way to preserve the Union while the Radicals saw it as a way to end slavery and the slave owners’ political power.

Victory must not come, therefore, through Democratic generals like McClellan, nor after a short war which would leave slavery untouched. This was a view which sometimes placed Radicals in the ‘position of regarding Union defeats on the battlefield as helpful to their cause.’ The Radicals would dominate the Republican party, Congress, and the Executive. They would form the President’s Cabinet, shape his policies, select his generals, and control the patronage.

The Committee for the Conduct of the War was hit upon as the Congressional agency over which the President would have no power. It was a Court of Star Chamber in every respect. It developed a refined technique for browbeating witnesses, suppressing testimony, damaging reputations, making oblique attacks upon Lincoln, and all under the guise of impartial investigations designed to mobilize efficiently the forces of victory.

With Washington full of amateur strategists, the army full of politicians, Lincoln indecisive and desperate for sound advice, and the Cabinet a hodge-podge, it is not surprising that the Radicals, with principles too high to let the Constitution stand in the way, soon got the smell of blood in their nostrils and were away in full pursuit. McClellan was fair game but difficult to corner, although some of his subordinates were the victims of pot-shots. Eventually, McClellan’s own weaknesses combined with the Radical sniping caused Lincoln to send him for cover.

The Radicals were adept at picking political generals who could not fight. These usually fell by the way, with never a tear shed by those who had urged them on Lincoln as saviors of the republic. When a general favored by the Radicals lost a battle, the blame was put on a Democratic or conservative subordinate; if a conservative won a battle, as in the case of Meade at Gettysburg, it was carefully explained that the credit should go elsewhere.

Even Grant was assailed as a Democrat until the Radicals decided they wanted to annex him, and Grant was politician enough to want to be annexed.”

(Lincoln and the Radicals, T. Harry Williams. University of Wisconsin Press, 1941. Review by R.H. Woody, Duke University. North Carolina Historical Review, Vol. XIX, No. 4, October 1942, pp. 410-411)

 

Seward and the Freedman

William H. Seward was a prewar Whig Governor of New York and after conversion to the nascent Republican party, served as Secretary of State 1861-1869. A prewar friend of Jefferson Davis and his wife, both privately considered Seward a man who lacked principle. Postwar, it was Seward as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who warned against trying Davis for treason as he sufficiently understood the Constitution to see it was Lincoln who actually committed the crime by waging war upon States.

Seward and the Freedman

“But Seward viewed the Black Codes as an issue of secondary importance. He was now more concerned with reconciliation between the white majorities, North and South, than he was with the fate of the blacks, for whom the war had already brought freedom. In April 1866 he gave an interview to Charles Eliot Norton and Edward Godkin, publishers of the influential magazine Nation. The fact that Godkin was a critic of President Johnson’s policies may account for some of the testiness of Seward’s remarks, but the secretary’s statements, as set down by Norton, are revealing.

According to Seward, there should be no question about readmitting the South to full representation in Congress; it had as much a right to representation as did the North. He then responded to a question about the blacks:

“The North has nothing to do with the Negro. I have no more concern for them than I have for the Hottentots. They are God’s poor; they always have been and always will be so everywhere . . . the laws of political economy will determine their position and the relations of the two races.”

(William Henry Seward, Lincoln’s Right Hand. John M. Taylor. HarperCollins, 1991, p260)