Category: Enemies of the Republic

Mankind’s War Fetish

 

English author and commentator H.G. Wells began writing newspaper articles in August 1914 commenting upon what was to be termed the “World War”; the articles would become assembled in a book entitled The War That Will End War. Arguing that the Central Powers led by Germany and Italy commenced the war, he saw that only the destruction of German militarism could end the conflagration.

American intervention – pursued by a president who was elected on a promise of keeping us out of the war – was decisive as cash advances to Britain, France and Russia amounting to some $9.6 billion stoked the fires. Postwar, America became the world’s banker with net foreign assets of around $11 billion by the end of 1919.

In 1918, Germany was defeated, its Kaiser banished, and punitive peace terms burdened the German people. Predictably, a nationalist arose within Germany who rebuilt his country’s military and ironically with French assistance through the Czech’s Skoda Works. Only twenty years after the Versailles Treaty, it was back to war. What is called World War Two – more accurately called the second half of the World War – led to an estimated 56 million military and civilian deaths, and an additional 38 million dead from war-related disease and famine.

Below, author Emil Ludwig cites the costs of the war to end war.

Mankind’s War Fetish

“The World War, which was on the verge of breaking out in the very first opening years of the opening century, is the great liquidation of debts created in the previous era and we desire and demand that it be associated with the nineteenth century. The second Hague Conference of 1907 was only a farce. During the weeks for which the third meeting was set in the summer of 1915, oratory could no longer be heard in The Hague due to the nearby thundering of cannon in Europe.

The cost of armament during the years from 1910 to 1914 amounted to 1.8 billions of dollars for Austria and Germany together and 2.4 billions for France and Russia – more than 4 billion. Yet these were small sums compared with those piled up by the War. On land and sea and in the air, 12,990,570 soldiers were killed in the World War. The war cost the combined combatants 250,000,000 billions of dollars – half of their combined national wealth. Thus, within four years, for no reason and without any essential consequences, Europe had sent up in smoke half of all it had gathered together during the preceding centuries. How should we characterize an act of this kind on the part of a large bank or a powerful family?

In so far as the victorious powers are concerned, France was a creditor nation to the extent of 30 billions before the war and a debtor to the extent of 31 billions afterward. During the struggle, the French national wealth decreased by a third; that of England by one fourth. Even the United States government had to expend during two years more than it had laid out in the course of over a century; and if in spite of this fact it remains today the creditor of the world, the reason is not participation in the second half of the war but rather abstention during the war’s first half. The smaller countries which remained neutral are in a relatively better position than any of the imperialist states.

With the exception of America, all the warring countries lost millions of men and billions of money; and any territory gained in the process at the expense of the conquered peoples is of intrinsic worth only in the case of new states established at the end.

Even the single positive result of the World War – the destruction of four realms anachronistically ruled by emperors, and the creation of eleven republics – was therefore purchased at a price which, in civil life, only an insane person would pay.”

“We punish an individual guilty of assault or murder, but the massacre of a people is considered a glorious deed.” Seneca

“Standing armies should in time cease to be, for they constitute a perennial threat of war to other states . . .”  Immanuel Kant

(Whither Mankind: A Panorama of Modern Civilization. Charles A. Beard, editor. Longmans, Green & Company, 1928, pp. 178-179)

 

Lincoln Chooses War

 

“The interval of eighty days between [Sumter] and the assembling of Congress gave Lincoln a virtual monopoly on emergency powers. Between his attempt to reinforce and resupply Fort Sumter – the latter odd since its garrison obtained food from Charleston markets – and the meeting of Congress in July, Lincoln had a virtual monopoly on assuming claimed “emergency powers.” After several States solemnly withdrew from the 1789 Constitution, Lincoln declared an “insurrection” to exist in seven States and called forth 75,000 militia to suppress this claim. On April 19, 1861, Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade – an act of war – of all States bordering the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, including North Carolina which remained within the Union at that time. In his July 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln explained his clearly unconstitutional actions while asserting that “this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy . . . can . . . maintain its territory against its own domestic foes.” It is clear that he was not familiar with Article III, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, for “waging war against Them [the States] or aiding and abetting their enemies.”

Lincoln Chooses War

“. . . the South considered secession a peaceable act, while according to the [Northern] point of view such secession was null and required a defensive attitude on the part of the federal government with a readiness to strike in retaliation for any act of resistance to the national authority. This drifting policy, accompanied by conditions in the social mind which can only be described as pathological, had led to the Sumter crisis; and war was upon the country with each side protesting that its actions were purely defensive, and that the opponent was the aggressor.

Lincoln took many other war measures. He issued two proclamations of blockade . . . He decreed an expansion of the regular army on his own authority [with] a further call on May 3rd for recruits to the regular army beyond the total authorized by law. Increasing the regular army is a congressional function, with Sen. John Sherman stating that “I never met anyone who claimed that the President could, by proclamation, increase the regular army.”

Lincoln’s message to Congress on July 4th, 1861, stated: “These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand and public necessity; trusting . . . that Congress would readily ratify them.” In a word, the whole machinery of war was set in motion by Lincoln, with all that this meant in terms of federal effort, departmental activity, State action and private enterprise.”

(The Civil War and Reconstruction. James G. Randall. D.C. Heath & Company. 1937, pp. 360-366)

Father of the Revolution – Samuel Adams

As described below, New England political agitation brought about the avoidable secession from England and war; the same occurred some 80 years later “as Massachusetts agitators and men of letters had done their best to see that there should be thousands, and tens of thousands” joining them in denouncing their union with the South. The uncompromising Puritan moral crusade against the very African slavery which ironically enriched their own section, would now be put to work to destroy the 1789 union. The agitation pushed the hand of Lincoln in April 1861 to confront now-independent South Carolina over the question of tariff revenue – which predictably resulted in gunfire and war. Those defending their State were denounced in the north as “rebels” intent upon destroying the union.

Father of the Revolution – Samuel Adams

“It is a great mistake to think of public opinion as united in the colonies and as gradually rising against British tyranny. Public opinion was never wholly united and seldom rises to a pitch of passion without being influenced – in other words, without the use of propaganda. The Great War [of 1914-1918] taught that to those who did not know it already.

From the first, [John] Adams and those working with him had realized the necessity of democratic slogans in the creation of a state of mind. [He] at once struck out boldly to inflame the passions of the crowd by threatening that it was to be reduced to the “miserable state of tributary slaves,” contrasting its freedom and moral virtue with the tyranny and moral degradation of England. He proclaimed that the mother country was bent on bringing her colonies to a condition of “slavery, poverty and misery,” and on causing their utter ruin, and dinned into the ears of the people the words “slavery and tyranny” until they assumed a reality from mere reiteration.

His political philosophy was eagerly lapped up by a populace smarting under hard times and resentful of colonial even more than imperial conditions of the moment. The establishment of government by free consent of all had become imbedded in the mind of the average man, as an essential part of the American dream. Adams himself had seen the vision but had glimpsed it with the narrowness and bitterness with which the more bigoted Puritans had seen the vision of an unloving and revengeful Hebrew Jehovah.

Such talk as this could only make England fearful of how far the people might try to put such precepts into practice. The upper classes of the colonies also began to be uneasy. Up to 1770, when their own grievances were redressed, they might allow such ideas to be disseminated, considering themselves in control of the situation, but after that it became clear that they were losing control . . . [as] Sam Adams and the lesser radicals worked harder than ever to keep public opinion inflamed.

With the upper classes [becoming] lukewarm or hostile to his continued propaganda [despite] the obnoxious legislation repealed or modified, [Sam Adams] had to trust to generalizations and emotional appeal.

A good example of his use of the latter was the affair called the “Boston Massacre.” As part of the general imperial policy following the [French and Indian] war, the British government had stationed some regiments in Boston. They were under good officers and good discipline, and there was no more reason why they should have made trouble there, than in any provincial garrison town of England. Sam Adams, however, was continually stirring up the public mind against them; John Adams reported finding Sam one Sunday night ‘preparing for the next day’s newspaper – a curious employment, cooking up paragraphs, articles and [incidents], working the political engine.’

Finally, one March evening, as a result of more than usual provocation given by taunting boys to soldiers on duty, an unfortunate clash occurred. There was confusion, a rioter’s shout to fire” was mistaken for an officer’s command, and several citizens were killed. The officer surrendered to civilian authorities, was tried, defended by John Adams and Josiah Quincy, Jr., and acquitted.

But Samuel Adams at once saw the value of the incident. Every emotion of the mob was played upon. The affair was termed a “massacre,” and in the annual speeches given for a number of years to commemorate its anniversary the boys and men who had taken part in the mobbing were described as martyrs to liberty and the soldiers as “bloody butchers.”

(The Epic of America. James Truslow Adams. Little, Brown and Company. 1932, pp. 83-84).

The Bitterness of Surrender

Like other defeated American soldiers in the South mid-1865, Gen. Bryan Grimes dealt with illness and “grief of surrender” amid constant rumors of pending retribution at the hands of the Yankee governors. One was “a report that they would hang all officers above the rank of captain and all their property confiscated,” his wife Charlotte recalled. “We were living in a “Reign of Terror.”

The Bitterness of Surrender

“Grim scenes abounded as homeward-bound North Carolinians rode south for home [after Appomattox]. One event in particular must have made him wonder what was in store for him as a defeated soldier without the means to fight back. According to Grimes’ astute traveling companion, Thomas Devereux:

“[We came upon] an old man, Loftin Terrel, his house was on the roadside, and he was knee-deep in feathers where [Sherman’s bummers] had ripped open the beds in search of valuables. A yearling and a mule colt were lying dead in the lot, they had been wantonly shot. Old man Terrel was sitting on his doorstep, he said there was not a thing left in the house and every bundle of fodder and grain of corn had been carried off; that he had been stripped of everything he owned and had not a mouthful to eat. They had even killed his dog which was lying dead near the house.”

On Sunday, April 16, 1865, Grimes rode into Raleigh atop his trustful horse Warren. Charlotte was “delighted to see him under any conditions,” but recalled that, “he would reproach me for want of patriotism when I said so, he was so miserable over [General Joseph Johnston’s] the surrender.”

The Federals garrisoning [Raleigh] issued orders forbidding former Confederates from wearing their uniforms. For many this directive presented a dilemma, for they had no other clothes to wear and no money to purchase new one. Charlotte responded to the order by covering her husband’s brass uniform buttons with bootblack, a ruse Grimes described made him look as though he was “in mourning for the Confederacy.” The ever-resourceful Charlotte, despite Grimes’ protestations, sold several of her silk dresses for $100 and used the money to purchase his civilian clothes. “It seemed to hurt him to have to use this money,” she explained, “but I would take no denial.”

Raleigh was a very different town from the one Grimes left four years earlier. The victorious Yankees seemed everywhere . . . [and he] no money, no income . . . [and] not a cent in the world, explained Charlotte, “except for a few gold pieces he had carried all through the war.” Fortunately, Grimes’ brother William was in a position to assist the destitute couple [and] gave them “two hundred dollars in gold quilted in a belt under my corsets,” wrote Charlotte.”

(Lee’s Last Major General: Bryan Grimes of North Carolina. T. Harrell Allen. Savas Publishing, 1999, pp. 258; 260)

 

Seward Insists Upon Servile War

Lincoln’s Secretary of State William Seward promised the cotton-dependent British an early end to war with “Northern victories releasing the raw cotton” of the South to England. Seward’s claim that New Orleans would soon be under his control was quickly dashed, and all were aware that Southern plantation owners would sooner burn their cotton bales than allow them to fall into enemy hands.  A desperate Seward then followed Virginia’s Royal Governor’s (Lord Dunmore) November 1775 edict to incite race war in the South, threatening both Britain and France that any aid to the American Confederacy would unleash a bloody slave uprising there. This would not only destroy Europe’s cotton source but also repeat the Haitian massacres of the early 1790’s which saw the slaughter of 4,000 white men, women and children. In retaliation, some 15,000 Africans were killed by the French.

Seward Insists Upon Servile War

“Fearing the growth in England, especially, of an intention to intervene, Seward threatened a Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat not so much in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of the material interests of England. In brief, considering foreign attitude and action in relation to Northern advantage – to the winning of the war – he would use emancipation as a threat of servile insurrection, but he did not desire emancipation itself for fear it would cause that very intervention which it was his object to prevent.

On May 28, 1862, Seward wrote to US diplomat Charles Francis Adams, emphasizing two points: first, US diplomats abroad were now authorized to state that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppression of slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreign nations would be forced to unleash servile war in the South.

Such a war, Seward argued, would be “completely destructive of all European interests” and a copy of this was given to Britain’s Lord Russell on June 20th . . . and that any attempts a European mediation of the conflict would result in servile war unleashed upon the South. On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and [Gideon] Welles of the planned [gradual and compensated] emancipation proclamation and that this was his first mention of it to anyone.

On July 28, after Lord Russell reviewed Seward’s arguments, commented on the fast- increasing bitterness of the American conflict which was disturbing and unsettling to European governments, and wrote: “The approach of servile war, so much insisted upon by Mr. Seward in his dispatch, only forewarns us that another element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a country so lately prosperous and tranquil.”

(Great Britain and the American Civil War. Ephraim Douglas Adams. Alpha Editions, 2018 (original manuscript 1924), pg. 388-390)

The Authority to Define and Suppress Treason in Ohio

Ambrose Burnside was the same northern commander who, when invading the Outer Banks and northeastern North Carolina, proclaimed that “We come to give you back law and order, the Constitution, your rights under it, and to restore peace.” What soon followed was looting, property seizure and destruction, and oppression.

When Burnside arrived at his new Department of the Ohio command at Cincinnati in early 1863, Lincoln’s commander of the Department of Indiana apprised him of extreme discontent and that Illinois and Ohio seemed “on the edge of a volcano” after Lincoln’s clamp down on dissent. Treason against the United States is succinctly defined in Section III, Article 3 of the U.S. Constitution as waging war against them, the States, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”

The Authority to Define and Suppress Treason in Ohio

“[In April 1863,] Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside became acquainted with his new duties as commander with headquarters in Cincinnati. His defeat at Fredericksburg the previous December still rankled him, affecting his disposition as well as his reputation.

General Burnside had no understanding of the reasons for the widespread disaffection in the upper Midwest. As a military general, and a discredited one at that, he understood only the law of force. He read the editorials and news stories in the Cincinnati Gazette and the Cincinnati Commercial but was incapable of recognizing their partisan slant. He accepted the Republican-sponsored interpretation that James J. Faran of the Cincinnati Enquirer, Logan of the Dayton Empire and Samuel Medary of the Crisis played a traitorous game. He believed they sowed the dragon’s teeth of discontent, aided the rebels of the South, and discouraged enlistments at the North.

Thus Burnside, in a rash moment, issued “General Orders, No. 38” on April 13, 1863. It was a military edict intended to intimidate Democratic critics of President Lincoln and the war. The “habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy,” Burnside stated, would no longer be tolerated in the Department of the Ohio; persons “committing such offenses” would be arrested and subject to military procedures – that is, be denied rights in the civil courts.

The indiscreet general thus set himself up as a censor to draw the fine line between criticism and treason and decide when a speaker or an editor gave aid and comfort to the enemy. He established his own will as superior to the civil courts, usurping for the military the right to define and judge, to determine the limits of dissent. Worse than that, his proclamation implied that criticism of Lincoln’s administration, in any form, was treason and that civil officials and civil courts had failed to do their duty by not eliminating it.

Speaking at a Republican political rally in Hamilton, halfway between Dayton and Cincinnati, Burnside gave clear evidence of his poor judgment. To the applause of partisans, he declared that he had the authority to define and suppress treason.”

(The Limits of Dissent – Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War. Frank L. Klement. Fordham University Press, 1998, pp. 148-150)

Secessionist Abolitionists

Any serious historical review of the war’s cause in early 1861 cannot overlook President James Buchanan’s realization, undergirded by his Attorney General Jeremiah Black, that to wage war against a State was the very definition of treason against the United States (Article III, Section 3). Lincoln would not be constrained by this.

Secessionist Abolitionists

“From the 1830s on, abolitionists argued for the secession of the North from the Union and the American Anti-Slavery Society passed the following resolution:

“That the Abolitionists of this country should make it one of the primary objects of this agitation to dissolve the American Union.”

This was also the view of the Douglass Monthly, printed by Frederick Douglass. Fellow abolitionist Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune wrote on February 23, 1861, the day after Jefferson Davis was inaugurated President of the Confederate States of America:

“We have repeatedly said . . . that the great principle embodied by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, that governments derive their powers from the consent of the people, is sound and just; and that, if the Cotton States or the Gulf States, choose to form an independent nation, they have a clear moral right to do so. Whenever it shall be clear that the great body of Southern people have become conclusively alienated from the Union, and anxious to escape from it, we will do our best to forward their views.”

(Was Davis a Traitor, or Was Secession a Constitutional Right Previous to the War of 1861, Albert Taylor Bledsoe, Fletcher & Fletcher, 1995 (original 1866), p. 149)

 

Historical Propaganda

The author below wrote that “propaganda is not necessarily dishonest, but it is necessarily one-sided and is almost certain to be strongly prejudiced.” Most if not all of the newspaper reporters sent to mid-1850s Kansas were New Englanders, a place which framed its own history and much at odds with the facts.  As an example, the “Boston Massacre” was in truth a street brawl between common British soldiers and town toughs, followed by nearly two years of peace and the popular leaders defending the soldiers’ actions. This event was later resurrected to help save the revolutionary cause and given a high-sounding name for effect.

Historical Propaganda

“The great posthumous fame of John Brown is partly the product of propaganda and partly the result of accident. There were a number of hot-headed abolitionists who went to Kansas Territory as correspondents for northern newspapers and whose chief business was to send back sensational accounts of conditions that obtained in the Territory. These men were naturally drawn into Brown’s camp, partly by their sympathies and partly by their desire for news. Men who are “good copy” are almost always popular with reporters.

After Brown’s execution, one of these men, James Redpath, published a Life of John Brown, which proved a “bestseller” during the presidential campaign of 1860. The next important addition to the literature of John Brown was the Life and Letters published in 1885 by Frank B. Sanborn. Sanborn was an eastern accomplice of Brown’s, and his book was therefore quite as much a defense of himself as of Brown. Finally, there was published in 1910 Oswald Garrison Villard’s John Brown Fifty Years After. Mr. Villard is the grandson of William Lloyd Garrison. His defense of Brown was not only following the promptings of his heart but vindicating the honor of the family.

A brilliant response to Mr. Villard was written by Hill P. Wilson under the title John Brown, Soldier of Fortune. A Critique (Cornhill Company, 1916), which has been almost ignored by historical scholars. Mr. Wilson enjoyed the advantage of a thorough familiarity with the frontier and its type of criminals. In his view, Brown was a common horse thief who used the slavery issue as a cloak to cover his nefarious practices. This I know was the opinion at the time of some of the free State leaders who knew Brown personally. His apotheosis was undoubtedly worked by the accident of the John Brown song, which became a marching song of the northern armies in the early war years and resulted in Brown’s canonization.

The notion that Brown was the liberator of Kansas is the most absurd pretention ever foisted upon a gullible public, and his attack upon Harpers Ferry greatly widened the breach with the South and rendered a peaceful settlement impossible.”

(Propaganda as a Source of American History. Frank Heywood Hodder, Mississippi Valley Review, Vol. IX, No. 1, June 1922, pp. 16-18).

Republicans Appeal to War Hatred in 1868

Republicans Appeal to War Hatred in 1868

“While the financial issue [concerning wartime Greenbacks] was at its height previous to the 1868 State election in Maine, the New York Tribune of 10 September 1868 gave this warning:

“We can lose by allowing Republicans to believe this campaign is merely or mainly a question of finance, of dollars and cents, and that the taxpayers will be enriched by repudiation [of debts]. It is the cohorts of the Rebellion, forming again for the capture, not merely for the seat of the Government, but of the Government itself.”

The following paragraph was printed in the New York Tribune of 9 October 1868, reprinted from the New York World. It showed a Democratic newspaper’s view of the Republicans using the War for campaign purposes:

“The Republicans are making the late war the hinge of the presidential campaign, invoking all the bitter animosities and sectional hatred prevailing when we were conscripting soldiers to fight the South. To accuse the Democratic party of slackness in the war seems their best electioneering weapon. To denounce the Southern people as Rebels is thought the best justification of the Republican party, and the subjugation and humiliation of the South is as much their aim now as it was six years ago.

It is not a policy of peace, but of passion, revenge and domination. The symbol of the canvass on the Republican side is the sword. Their leader is a man who knows no trade except war, selected because the old feeling of hostility would more naturally rally around him than a civilian statesman.”

Reference after reference could be made concerning the Republican appeal to the war hatred of the masses of the North.”

(Political Campaign and Election of General Grant in 1868. George A. Olson. Thesis excerpt, pp. 66-67. University of Kansas, 1928)

 

Democrat Dilemma in 1868

The Republican party’s 1861-1865 war not only subjugated the American South, but the North as well. By virtue of this and contrary to the assertion below in 1868, the US Constitution had become a dead letter when a President ordered the invasion and overthrow of States in 1861, and Congress acquiesced.

For their 1868 presidential candidate, the Radicals selected Gen. Grant. Of the latter, the National Intelligencer of 9 June, 1868 wrote:

“General Grant is . . . nothing but a convenient instrument in the hands of Radical wirepullers. He knows nothing of civil affairs, the political history of the country, and cares nothing for either one or the other. He is a fortunate soldier, and no more, with limited capacity, and an absence of all training for the administration of government.”

“To support Grant, Radical leaders formed “Loyal Leagues” in the South who drilled members to vote Republican. They catered to the fancy of the Negro voter by promises of land and mules, elaborate initiation ceremonies, and the use of rituals and passwords in their secret meetings. Organizations of such a nature in the ranks of the white and Negro populace of the South were bound to result in riots and disorder in the campaign. This would be to the advantage of the Radical Republicans as they could say to Northern the voters that their plan f reconstruction was necessary in the South”.

Below is a letter from vice-presidential nominee General Francis Blair on June 30, 1868, to Col. James O. Brodhead of Missouri.

Democrat Dilemma in 1868

The reconstruction policy of the [Republican] Radicals will be complete before the next election; the [Southern] States so long excluded will have been admitted, Negro suffrage established, and the carpetbaggers installed in their seats in both branches of Congress.

There is no possibility of changing the political character of the Senate, even if the Democrats should elect their presidential candidate and hold a majority of the popular branch of Congress. We cannot, therefore, undo the Radical plan of reconstruction by congressional action; the Senate will continue to bar its repeal.

Must we submit to it? How can it be overthrown?

It can only be overthrown by the authority of the Executive, who is sworn to maintain the Constitution, and will fail to do his duty if he allows the Constitution to perish under a series of congressional enactments which are in palpable violation of its fundamental principles.

There is but one way to restore the government and the Constitution, and it is for the President-elect to declare these Reconstruction acts null and void, compel the US Army to undo its usurpations at the South, disperse the carpetbag State governments, allow the white people to re-organize their own governments, and elect Senators and Representatives. The House of Representative will contain a majority of Democrats from the North, and they will admit the Representatives elected by the white people of the South, and with the cooperation of the President, it will not be difficult to compel the Senate to submit once more to the obligations of the Constitution.

What can a Democratic president do if Congress is controlled by carpetbaggers and their allies? He will be powerless to stop the supplies by which the Negroes are organized into political clubs – by which an army is maintained to protect these vagabonds in their outrages upon the ballot. We must have a president who will execute the will of the people by trampling into dust the usurpations of Congress known as the reconstruction acts.

Your friend, Frank P. Blair.”

(Political Campaign and Election of General Grant in 1868. George A. Olson. Master’s Thesis excerpt, pp. 44-46; 56. University of Kansas, 1928)