Circa1865

The American military of 1860 was one still restricted by the view that a standing army was a threat to peace and liberty. Sensing danger after the John Brown violence at Harpers Ferry, Americans in the South formed local militia units and Safety Committees reminiscent of those in 1776 days. Lincoln’s seizure of power after Fort Sumter was enabled by a recessed Congress which would not convene until July; the demonstrated threat of anyone opposing his will; and Republican governors who provided him with troops.

Indeed, the matters of national versus State powers WERE studied in law schools and universities and West Point – the federal agent was left intentionally weak by the Founders who feared a strong central authority which would threaten and overpower the States.

Lincoln had no “war powers” as commander in chief as Congress had not declared war as required by the US Constitution. Additionally, and as the latter stipulated in Article III, Section 3, treason was waging war against “Them,” the States. This was the Framers way of dealing with possible civil war in the future, and those responsible sharing the fate of John Brown.

The following excerpt ignores the hidden economic and political machinations for war against the American South in 1861, and naively claims that northern officials in 1861 were forced to meet the South’s departure with novel ideas. The answers were found in the Constitution.

Wartime Ways

“Almost totally civilian in habits and local orientation, American were simply unready for the spectacle of “national” soldiers – even hastily uniformed neighbors – performing police functions. From the days after [Fort] Sumter all through 1861, arrests of civilians by soldiers and suspension of the revered though little understood privilege of habeas corpus were the most visible evidence of war.

Unrestrained journalism, unfettered communications, and unsubdued opposition politics attended to the “arbitrary arrests” and the “prisoners of state,” and their incarcerations in “American Bastilles.” There, military commissions pronounced ferocious penalties under the unknown and therefore doubly worrisome tenets of martial law.

Debate shifted to the habeas corpus suspensions, to the scope of “war powers” and of the commander-in-chief functions, the basic question of whether what was going on was a war between nations or a civil war, to altering configurations of national-State relationships, to the applicability of the Bill of Rights to wartime ways, and to the role of the national and State’s judiciaries in supplying answers to war-born uncertainties.

A hundred years ago, these matters were unstudied in law schools, ignored in universities, and unknown in West Point’s curriculum. Among government officials, ignorance about them was all but complete. Legal literature on such themes was inadequate if not irrelevant. After Sumter, persons who sought guidance on internal security matters found themselves in an everyman’s-land of assumptions, conjectures and surmises. Precise questions did not exist, much less answers. It was all novel and startling.”

(A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution. Harold M. Hyman. Houghton Mifflin Company. 1975, pp. 65-66)

As late as the 1850s, Portuguese slave dealers operated from New York harbor purchasing ships for the slave trade, bribing customs officials and sailing them to Cuba for outfitting as slavers. The ships then sailed for West Africa to purchase slaves, with a return voyage to Cuba or Brazil to be sold for sugar plantation labor.

Africa’s Traditional System

“The early West African colonies of freed blacks, such as Liberia, had to be defended by cannon and stockades from the local native rulers who rightly saw them as a threat to their profits from the slave trade. The whole of West Africa was geared to domestic slavery and the slave trade.

Slavery had always been part of black African society as it was the usual method of recruiting labor for wealthy farms, for ironworks and gold mines. Slaves were also used to transport goods in long-distance trade and as a form of negotiable currency in transactions. Skilled laborers, such as blacksmiths, were usually slaves. For chiefs, the transatlantic slave export trade was a bonus on top of these other aspects of their traditional slave system, but a valuable one and they were reluctant to give it up.

[On Africa’s west coast in the early 1800s], some of the most inveterate and cunning slave operators were detribalized blacks, mulattoes, often free freedmen or sons of former slaves, who had returned from Brazil to make their fortunes. One such black, Petro Kogio, based at Anecho, “raided for slaves and bought Manchester cottons,” operating under a respectable front of palm oil. Another palm dealer was George Lawson, a Fanti from Accra and former steward on a slaver, who “saluted all flags and provided false information for [British] naval officers,” dealt widely in slaves and founded the rich Lawson dynasty.

Another liberated slave, Francisco Felix Da Souze, acted as a slave broker for inland kings: “His riches and hospitality became the legend of the coast, and he charmed even missionary opponents with manners which were easy and graceful, and exhibited the finished gentleman. The coast abounded with such rogues.

An eyewitness described how the West Africa slave trade operated in the 1820’s:

“As soon as a vessel arrives at her place of destination, the crew discharge her light cargo, with the manacles intended for the slaves, and land the captain at the same time. The vessel avoids any nearby British man-of-war and anchors at the pre-determined spot on the day the living cargo is loaded.”

The profits for the wily were huge. A slave bought for 15 or 20pds in Lagos would fetch 50 to 80pds in Brazil, and often as much as 120pds. The vessels were often fast clippers, usually built in New England and even flying the American flag, though more usually those of France or Portugal. They could outpace most Royal Navy ships.”

(The Birth of the Modern: World Society 1815-1830. HarperCollins Publishers, 1991, pp. 331-333)

Undoubtedly the cause of the 1861 war was the purely sectional Republican party which emerged from the ashes of the Whig party, anti-immigrant Know Nothings, and Transcendentalists. Though it lost the 1856 national election, it would win in 1860 by a plurality with the addition of a high protective tariff which pleased the protectionist New England States. Though several Southern States which had not departed before February 1861 attended the Washington Peace Conference in an attempt to save the federal union, Lincoln had instructed his Republican attendees to avoid compromise.

War Millionaires of America

“The [Civil] war, author Charles Beard held, was an important determinant of industrial change after 1865 because of the manner in which industrial interests made use of the political power they had won. In Beard’s view, the ascendant Republican party was the tool of the new capitalist class. These capitalists were united in subscribing to the basic proposition that the government ought to foster industrial expansion. Successive Republican congresses duly accomplished this by enacting the national banking law, a high protective tariff, a contract labor law, lavish land grants to railroads, and the Homestead Act which in addition to giving land to settlers also expanded the domestic market.

One of the [Civil] war’s main effects was its contribution to “the extraordinary growth of heavy industry (iron, machinery, agricultural implements, lumber, clay products)” – a trend which characterized the whole period 1850-1880. While economic forces generated by the war worked to the advantage of heavy industry, [Louis] Hacker wrote [Triumph of American Capitalism, 1940], “the young industrial capitalism had by 1860 already formulated its political program for continued growth – “protectionism, a well-guarded banking system, and adequate labor supply, and expanding domestic market made possible by a federally-supported public works program.”

By the time the war had ended in 1865, Congress had virtually enacted this program, taking “a long step forward in placing the services of the state at the command of private enterprise.” The economic legislation of the war and Reconstruction periods comprised “a new and vital force” that shaped the course of postwar change. “The progress of industrial capitalism was at last being rendered secure,” Hacker concluded, and it was being done in the halls of Congress.

Mechanization was undertaken in response to heavy demands generated by the war, and in order to do this successfully, ever larger capital outlays were necessary for industrialists. This came from large-scale organizers who could tap “the reservoir of credit” produced by wartime profits and flotation of federal securities.

The result was a basic structural transformation – “the concentration of manufacturing capital in fewer hands than before, the construction of larger plants, and the appearance of a new class of war millionaires.”

(Economic Change in the Civil War: An Analysis of Recent Studies. Harry N. Scheiber. Civil War History, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1965. pp. 398-400)

Democracy and King Numbers

“Thwarted by the aristocratic minority in calling legitimate conventions, the democratic majority in the old States now threatened to take the matter into their own hands and call extra-legal conventions. Mass meetings were held in Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia and Maryland; pools were conducted in various counties, all of which voted overwhelmingly for calling conventions; grand jury presentments called attention to the need for reform and recommended direct action if the legislatures failed to act; the voters in many counties instructed their representatives in the legislature to support a bill calling a constitutional convention; and hundreds of petitions went to the legislatures demanding relief.

Typical of the sentiment for calling extra-legal conventions is the statement of a North Carolinian that if the legislature failed “to comply with the wishes of a great majority of the State,” the “a convention will be assembled in the west and the constitution amended without the concurrence of the east; and this being the act of a majority, and the legal act will consequently be obligatory on the whole State. The constitution will be amended.  

The North Carolina legislature capitulated and called a convention to meet at the same time and place as that called extra-legally. In like manner the legislatures of Virginia, Mississippi and Tennessee, at the demand of the people, called conventions to revise their constitutions. This was one of the most signal victories for majority or popular rule in American history. Democracy had won a victory over aristocracy.

John C. Calhoun, Abel P. Upshur and other aristocratic leaders of the South openly denied the Jeffersonian ideal of equality of all men and bitterly condemned majority rule as the tyranny of king numbers; and they had their supporters in the north among such men as James Kent, Joseph Story and Orestes Brownson. The less famous and little- known leaders of democracy just as boldly proclaimed the doctrine of political equality.

For the first time the people had been consulted as to the revision and amendment to their constitutions. In the issue of Negro suffrage, Virginia and North Carolina joined Maryland and Kentucky in taking from the free Negro the ballot he had heretofore possessed. In like manner all new States of the period, North as well as South, denied suffrage to free Negroes. And New York in 1821 limited Negro suffrage by requiring that he possess a freehold valued at 250 dollars over and above all indebtedness.

In actual practice, the American people had decided by their constitutional provisions that Negroes were not included in the political people.”

(Democracy in the Old South. Fletcher M. Green. Journal of Southern History, Vol. XII, No. 1, February 1946, pp -16.

From 1863 through 1865, newly recruited and reenlisting northern soldiers received generous cash bonuses which made them quite wealthy as they returned home. In addition to the US government paying some $300 million in bounties during the war, northern State and local governments paid soldiers an equal amount to wear the uniform.  In stark contrast, the Southern soldier on average was an ill-nourished, physical wreck who returned penniless to burned homes and farms – and an empty State treasury from which to assist veterans in rebuilding their lives.

Raiders of the US Treasury

“Like all veterans’ organizations, the United Confederate Veterans (UCV) was concerned to a greater or lesser degree with obtaining funds from the public treasury for the relief of its members, many of whom were in need.

The north’s Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) was more determined than the UCV to obtain such largesse from the federal government, although as the organization that represented the victorious Union army and navy, its membership was in much less need than were the Southern veterans.

The UCV was hopeful that the various States would provide for the destitute former soldiers and sailors, but as William W. White wrote in the Confederate Veteran, “it is surprising that a group of veterans with so much political power asked for so little from their State governments . . . They viewed themselves not only as veterans but as common citizens and taxpayers.”

This is in contrast to the GAR, which exercised pressure over the years for more and more pensions for northern veterans. “The Grand Army kept in view a very tangible purpose, cash benefits for veterans,” Dixon Wecter wrote in When Johnny Comes Marching Home.  “Only in private dared a well-known statesman to say, apropos of a pension bill, that the GAR having saved the country, now wanted it,” author Wecter declared. Such sentiments seem to have been widely held.

The Nation spoke for many Eastern liberals when it described the GAR as a political party “formed for the express purpose of getting from the government a definite sum in cash for each member of it.” One writer says that by the nineties . . . anyone who opposed to GAR pensions was, at the very least, ‘unpatriotic and un-American,’ and probably a former rebel or Copperhead.”

A member had warned the organization just before its 1887 encampment against asking for more pensions, and urged it “to make clear that the GAR is not organized for the purpose of raiding the US treasury.”

(The Last Review: The Confederate Reunion, Richmond 1932. Virginius Dabney. Algonquin Books, 1984, pp. 26-27)

Diabolical Plot at Appomattox

“The most vehement of all the controversies during the 1932 convention erupted at sessions of the Confederated Southern Memorial Association, an organization composed of representatives of various women’s organizations scattered over the South who were in charge of Confederate cemeteries and similar institutions.

A proposed monument at Appomattox was the cause of this unfortunate outburst. The suggestion for such a memorial originated with the citizens of Appomattox and the nearby city of Lynchburg, and legislation providing for the shaft had been introduced in Congress by Senator Claude Swanson and Representative Henry St. George Tucker, both of Virginia.

A contest was held for the design and William C. Noland, one of Virginia’s most distinguished architects who had designed the Jefferson Davis Monument in Richmond, was chairman of the committee that made the award.

Noland and his associates chose the entry submitted by a Philadelphia firm. It called for a fifty-seven-foot shaft, banded with laurel, with the great seal of the United States on the front, an image of US Grant on one side and of Robert E. Lee on the other. The pavement under the base was to be blue and grey. The inscription was: “North – South; Peace – Unity. Appomattox, the Site of the Termination of the War Between the States, 1861-1865.”

The CSMA convention went into an uproar over the proposal. A resolution was introduced rejecting the entire concept. The memorial was termed “an insult to General Lee and to every Southern soldier who fought and died for the Confederate cause.” An overheated Southern lady termed it a memorial to “that butcher Grant.”

Mrs. Norma Hardy Britton of Washington, DC, a member of the CSMA, was the sole person to speak on behalf of the monument. She argued that the plan was a “mark of conciliation from the North,” a statement that almost precipitated a fight among the members,” according to the Richmond News Leader. The great majority took the view that it was a diabolical plot concocted by the North to humiliate the South.

When the vote was taken, only four persons supported the plan.”

(The Last Review: The Confederate Reunion, Richmond 1932. Virginius Dabney. Algonquin Books, 1984, pp. 22-24)

The first of Richmond’s 1861-1865 patriot memorials was that to Stonewall Jackson, dedicated in 1875. The impressive statue was “presented by English gentlemen” who greatly admired “the soldier and patriot” whose deeds it commemorated. Fifteen years would elapse before the impoverished American South could manage to provide a similar memorial to Robert E. Lee.  Of note, though colored militia units did not participate in the Lee Monument parade, they had marched in the funeral procession two days earlier in honor of Gen. George Pickett.

The sculptor of the Lee monument was Jean Antoine Mercie’ was a graduate of the Paris Ecole de Beaux Arts and acclaimed throughout Europe. He also sculpted the Marquis de Lafayette Monument at Baltimore in 1891, and the Francis Scott Key monument at Baltimore in 1911. The Lincoln government arrested the latter’s grandson, a newspaper editor, in May 1861.

Robert E. Lee Monument at Richmond

“[The] Unveiling of the Lee equestrian statue at Richmond in 1890, on what later became Monument Avenue, was an event to which the South had been looking forward almost since the close of hostilities. Raising the money to pay for it was one problem, and calming the rivalry between two organizations that wanted to take the lead in raising it was another. There were also disagreements concerning the design.

The first competition awarded the contract to a “Yankee” sculptor from Ohio. This aroused the Confederate ire of the always bellicose General [Jubal] Early, who wrote [Virginia] Governor Fitzhugh Lee that “if the statue of General Lee is erected after that model,” he (Early) would “get together all the surviving members of the Second Corps and blow it up with dynamite.”

So, another competition was held, and the model submitted by Jean Antoine Mercie’ of France was chosen. This statue, showing Lee seated on Traveller, was received with universal satisfaction. When it arrived from Europe, hundreds of veterans and others turned out and pulled it with ropes to the site at what is today the intersection of Allen and Monument Avenues.

The unveiling went off without a hitch. There were fifteen thousand Confederate veterans in the parade, fifty generals in grey among them, along with ten thousand other citizens. The procession took two hours to pass by.”

(The Last Review: The Confederate Reunion, Richmond 1932. Virginius Dabney. Algonquin Books, 1984, pg. 7)

“History is not amenable to controlled testing. Consequently, we have no way of knowing if the United States actually won the war for the Allies. My own contention is more modest: without those millions of pounds sterling, those millions of tons of high explosives, and those two million American soldiers, the Allies would have lost the war. In this war there were no victors. If the US wanted to impose a new world order on Europe, it failed abysmally. If France and Great Britain intended to create a new balance of power, they failed as well. That they certainly failed to destroy Germany as a great power is a fact so painfully obvious that it hardly bears mention.” John Mosier

With the war over thanks to Woodrow Wilson’s intervention and cries of “democracy,” the French and British went to work destabilizing Germany with punitive peace terms. One could say with some accuracy that Wilson was instrumental in setting the stage for a nationalist leader who replaced the Kaiser. And the carnage resumed after an 18-year interval.

Killing Fields of the World War

“But in the Great War, about two out of every three German fatalities were caused by artillery fire, and only a little over half the live wounded were caused by rifle and machine gun bullets. Seven out of every ten British casualties and three out of every four French were caused by artillery. For American soldiers, the figures were equally skewed. An American medical report stated that artillery missiles caused more wounds and death in the World War; during the Civil War it was small arms.

The nature of war had changed. It was no longer the numbers of riflemen that counted, it was the guns. The German army was no larger than the French army, but in firepower it had an advantage of somewhere between four to one and twelve to one. When the war began the Germans deployed weapons the Allies did not possess, weapons they had refused to build, and weapons they believed could not be built.

The improved killing range of artillery now made the standard method of fire as indirect, aimed at map coordinates relayed to the gunners by an observer. Once the range was taken for the target, a battery could dump over a hundred rounds on the target in a minute. This left the defenders no time to seek cover, and little warning before a strike. The casualties of course were horrendous:

Allied losses for the first three reporting periods of the war, 1914, and the two six-month periods of 1915, were 982,000, 815,000 and 649,000 respectively. British losses during the Somme campaign from July to November 1916 were just over 498,000. French losses between February and June 1916 amounted to 442,000 men. The stalemate of 1917 cost the lives of 150,000 British and Canadian men – plus 100,000 German lives.

In a five-week period of March-April 1918, the BEF lost almost 150,000 dead and missing: the Germans 105,000 dead and missing. The American cemetery at Belleau Wood holds 2289 graves and commemorates another 1,060 missing. At Meuse-Argonne the AEF had about 5000 soldiers killed outright – by October the number climbed to 22,000. The American cemetery at Romagnes-sous-Montfaucon has 14,240 graves – more than the cemetery at Normandy. The BEF lost 29,000 men killed and missing in September and 44,000 in September-October; the French lost 63,000 killed and wounded. The cemetery at Souain is one of the largest French military cemeteries in the world, with the remains of 30,743 soldiers, while the ossuary of the Navarin up the road, holds another ten thousand.

Champagne-Ardennes, far more than Verdun or Artois, was the graveyard of the French army: 111,659 soldiers are buried there, and another 36,000 are buried in the cemeteries of the Argonne.

With 345,000 men killed or missing, the BEF that had survived third Ypres had perished during the spring and summer of 1918. The same could be said of the French, who had 340,000 men dead or missing in this same period, or about twice the German losses of about 230,000. Nearly 117,000 American soldiers lost their lives after only 200 days in actual combat in 1917 and 1918.  But without Pershing’s two million Americans in Europe, there was no army capable of beating Germany. Wilson’s terms became the Allied terms. Suddenly, the Great War was over. Peace had broken out.”

(The Myth of the Great War: How the Germans Won the Battles and How the Americans Saved the Allies. John Mosier. HarperCollins Publishers, pp. 2; 38-41; 332-333)

Canada Feared Invasion

In the end Great Britain chose the course of neutrality because it realized that to do otherwise gambled with the security of its Canadian possessions. Neutrality offered a diplomatic protection for Canada and assured the Northern States that Canada would have no part to play in support for the South.

By 1864, the fear of northern invasion lingered, and as events would show, it was not unfounded. The Union army had grown from a group of hastily recruited civilians into the largest standing army in the world. As General Sir Charles Hastings Doyle observed in a letter to his Canadian commander Sir Fenwick Williams: “They are formidable. If they persevere, they must ultimately succeed.”

And what of the North won and turned its eye to Canada in anger? Or, if the South won its independence and the North turned to Canada for compensation? Hastings Doyle, who was commander of British Troops Atlantic, which included Bermuda, put this to Williams, relating a conversation he’d had with American military commander Ulysses S. Grant and General George Meade during a visit to the siege of Richmond.

“I sympathize with neither side, for they both hate us cordially,” Hastings Doyle wrote. “I used to chafe them a good deal about when they planned to pay you and I a visit. The reply I invariably received was: ‘Oh, we do not have anything to say to you until we have taken Mexico.’ There is but one feeling. Mexico will be theirs when the war with the South is over.”

(Dixie and the Dominion: Canada, the Confederacy and the War for the Union. Adam Mayers, The Dundurn Group. 2003, pp. 52-53)

New York City in 1712

[The population of New York City in 1741] “numbered only about ten thousand, one-fifth of which [were] negroes, who were slaves. Their education being wholly neglected, they were ignorant and debased, and addicted to almost every vice. They were besides, restive under their bondage and the severe punishments often inflicted upon them., which caused their master’s a great deal of anxiety.

Not isolated as an inland plantation, but packed in a narrow space, they had easy communication with each other and worse than all, with the reckless and depraved crews of the vessels that came into port.

It is true, the most stringent measures were adopted to prevent them from assembling together; yet, in spite of every precaution, there would now and again come to light some plan or project that would fill white New Yorkers with alarm. They felt half the time as though walking on the crust of a volcano, and hence were in a state of mind to exaggerate every danger and give credit to every sinister rumor.

Only thirty years before occurred such an outbreak as they now feared. On the 7^th of April 1712, the house of Peter Van Tilburgh was set on fire by negroes, which was evidently meant as a signal for a general revolt.

The cry of “fire” roused the neighboring inhabitants, and the rushed out toward the blazing building. They saw . . . in the red light of the flames, a band of negroes armed with guns and knives . . . who fired and then rushed on them with their knives, killing several on the spot. The rest, leaving the building to the mercy of the flames, ran to the fort on the Battery and roused the Governor who ordered a cannon to be fired from the ramparts to alarm the town. The soldiers hurried forward towards the fire while more negroes joined the rioters, who stood firm until the gleam of bayonets and a single musket volley forced them to flee toward what is now Wall Street.

The scattered white inhabitants the rioters encountered were attacked with their knives, killing and wounding several as the black mob made for the nearby woods and swamps. Some, finding themselves closely pressed and all avenues of escape closed off, deliberately shot themselves, preferring such a death to the one they knew awaited them. How many [colored] were killed and captured during the morning, the historian does not tell us. We can only infer that the number must have been great, from the statement he incidentally makes, that “during the day nineteen more were taken, tried and executed – some that turned State’s evidence were transported. Eight or ten whites had been murdered,” and many more wounded.

It was a terrible event and remembered by the present inhabitants with horror and dismay. Many middle-aged men, in 1741, were young men at the time and remembered the fearful excitement that prevailed then.”

(The Great Riots of New York: 1712 to 1873. Joel Tyler Headley. Dover Publications, pp. 26-28)